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Abstract 
Despite recelvmg much more generaus benefits, Gennan lone-parent social-assistance 
recipients receive benefits for no langer periods of time, on average, than da U.S. lone-parent 
recipients. We find several reasons for this. First, social assistance is used more often in 
Gennany as very shorHenn bridge funding prior to the beginning of receipt of social-insurance 
benefits such as unemployment compensation. Second, repeat speils are considerably more 
common in the United States. Third, Gennan lone-parent recipients have older children -- a 
characteristic that leads to shorter speils. Our findings point out a number of problems with 
analyses of social-assistance dynamics based on individual speils. 
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Introduction 
Comparative income-distribution data from the Luxembourg rncome Study (LIS) show large 
differences across countries in the number of low-income families with children. With the 
poverty line defined as half of the annual income received by the median family, LIS data show 
in the mid-l980s a poverty rate among families with children in the United States that was three 
to four times as high as rates in (West) Germany (23% as compared with 6%) and other 
continental European countries and seven times as high as in Sweden. Poverty rates in Canada 
and the United Kingdom were eloser to but still substantially less than those estimated for the 
United States.1 
A key factor in producing these differing rates of poverty is the much more generous package of 
social-assistance programs available to families with children in general and to lone parents in 
particular in Western Europe (O'Higgins, 1988). Duncan et al. (forthcoming) calculated the 
ratio of cash and near-cash social assistance available to lone parents with two children as a 
percentage of median family income in the mid-1980s and obtained the following figures: 
United States, 27%; (West) Germany, 47% to 67%, depending on the age of the children; 
Canada, 41 %; France, 18% to 54%, depending on the age of the children and recency of 
divorce; Ireland, 55%; Luxembourg, 51 %; the Netherlands, 61 %; Sweden, 64%; and the United 
Kingdom, 60%. Thus, with the exception of France, benefit packages are much more generous 
outside of the United States. 
European social-assistance programs typically build greater disincentives to work into their 
social-assistance benefit schedules. When Duncan, et al. (forthcoming) extended their 
calculations to inelude the case of a lone parent with two children working half-time at the 
minimum wage, they found the following increments (or decrements) to the resulting total 
family income, again expressed as a fraction of median family income: United States, + 12% (in 
other words, the income eamed from a half-time job at the minimum wage, less the reduction in 
social assistance associated with the eamed income, would increase the total family income of a 
lone parent with two children by 12 points, i.e., from 27% of median income to 39% of median 
income)2; (West) Germany, -5% (i.e., total family income would actuaUy faUl; Canada, +19%; 
I Tim Smeeding kindly provided the following calculations. They are based on a definition of poverty 
that sets the line at 50% of the country's median size-adjusted income and the equivalence scale 
(single person: 1.0; couple: 1.29; couple plus child: 1.55; couple plus two children: 1.95; couple plus 
three children: 2.29; couple plus four children: 2.57; couple plus five children: 2.88; couple plus six 
children: 3.16; couple plus seven or more children: 3.87) implicit in the V.S. poverty lhresholds. 
Estimated poverty rates are: United States (23%), (West) Germany (6%), the Netherlands (6%), 
France (8%), Sweden (3%), Canada (14%) and the Uni ted Kingdom (11 %). 
2 Tbe U.S. figures apply to Colorado, the state paying the median benefit in 1985. In Colorado at that 
time, incorne from a half-time. minimum-wage job would not have resulted in a 105S of eligibility for 
AFDC and the Medicaid medical insurance program. In a number of other states. income from such 
a job would have ended AFDC recipiency and eligibility fcr Medicaid. 
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France, 0 to +28%, depending Oll the age of the children and recency of divorce; Ireland, 
+10%; Luxembourg, +9%; the Netherlands, +7%; Sweden, +3%; the United Kingdom, +9%. 
Thus, work incentives built into benefit schedules tend to be larger in North America and are 
even negative in Germany. 
Economic theory suggests that the more generous redistributive income-transfer programs that 
reduce poverty in Europe mayaIso reduce incentives to work, save, marry and engage in other 
behaviors that might shorten speils of social-assistance receipt. There is considerable consensus 
among U.S. researchers that the U.S. soeial-assistance system has produced measurable but 
rather modest reductions of work effort and other mobility-related behavior (Moffitt, 1992). The 
overall effects of U.S. transfer programs on labor supply have not been very large because the 
programs themselves have not been very generous. It is quite possible that the more generous 
European transfer programs have larger effects. Indeed, a detailed study of the Dutch disability 
system (Wolfe, De Jong and Haveman, 1984) found much larger effects for the more generous 
Dutch system. 
Duncan et al. (forthcoming) investigated whether the duration of social-assistance speils in the 
U.S ., Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom varied with the levels of benefit generosity. 
Lone-parent recipients in the Uni ted Kingdom had the longest speils, with 84% of lone parents 
who had begun speils of soeial assistance still receiving it after three years.3 This compares 
with only 58% for lone parents in (the Quebec province of) Canada, 36% for AFDC lone-parent 
recipients in the United States and 26% for lone-parent social-assistance recipients in Germany. 
That U.K. recipients have long speils is hardly surprising: British benefit levels are quite high, 
employment conditions are poor, norms may weil discourage mothers from working and the 
stigma attached to soeial assistance appears to be smalI. A contrasting set of conditions in the 
United States may account for the comparatively short speils of U.S. recipients. Why recipients 
in Germany, with its high benefits levels, should have speils as short as recipients in the United 
Slates emerges as a key question in understanding how countries might successfully combine 
generous benefit levels and upward economic mobility . 
This paper foeuses on the duration of soeial-assistance receipt 111 the United States and 
Germany, the only two countries for which sufficiently comparable data on social-assistance 
3 The U.K. data co me from • 1989 survey of lone parents which asked for infannation about current .nd 
previous periods of social-assistance receipt. Since the social-assistance experiences of warnen who 
remain lane parents are undoubtedly lünger than those cf the "average" recipient. this will almost 
certainly impart an upward bias to the estimated duration of social-assistance speils in the U.K .. 
although similar restrietions imposed on a PSID sam pie suggest that {he bias may not be very large 
(Duncan et al.. forthcoming). 
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speils appear to exis!. We concentrate on assistance programs directed at single-parent families 
with children. 
Our aim is to describe and then explain differences in the duration of welfare receipt among 
first-time lone-parent recipients in the two countries. Our descriptive analysis takes a number of 
different approaches to deal with the problem that social assistance is often received in a 
number of distinct episodes; our emphasis throughout is on the total amount of time spent 
receiving social assislance rather than on the duration of the first speIl. 
Our models of the duration of social-assistance receipt relate the duration of receipt to 
comparably-defined demographie characteristics of recipients, e.g., age and work experience of 
the mother at the time of first receipt, age of children and characteristics of the neighborhoods in 
which recipient families reside. We first examine the extent to which parameter estimates of the 
demographie models differ between the two countries' sampies and then use differences in the 
demographie characteristics to account for the observed differences in patterns of receipt. 
The Institutional and Demographie Context 
Public assisrance. The Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program is the 
principal U.S. means-tested cash transfer program for lone-parent families. Benefit levels are 
determined by individual states, with states in the South paying only one-third to one-fourth as 
much as the most generous Northern states. When combined with the value of benefits from the 
Food Stamp program, payments to a lone-parent family with two children in the median-benefit 
state (Colorado) in 1985 amounted to 27% of size-adjusted U.S. median family income. 
During the period covered by our analysis, states also had the option of denying benefits to 
families in which the father was not presen!. In the mid-1980s, states representing roughly half 
of the U.S. population chose this option; however, two-parent families have never constituted 
more than a small fraction of the caseload even in states that permitted payments to such 
families. 
In Germany there is no special social-assistance program for families with dependent children. 
The two principal means-tested programs that provide cash assistance to these and other 
categories of low-income families and individuals are "Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt" (income 
maintenance support, commonly ca lied "Sozialhilfe") and "Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen" 
(aid for people with special needs -- e.g., aid for the blind or handicapped or in need of long-
term care, medical aid for people without health insurance). Sozialhilfe covers recurring 
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expenditures like food, accommodation and, after special application, nonrecurring expenditures 
such as fumiture and clothing. These two programs provide the bulk of the assistance to the 
growing number of claimants of welfare benefits in Germany . Benefit levels vary modestly 
from state (Bundesland) to state.4 
Single-pa ren! families . Both the incidence and social-assistance receipt of lone-parent families 
in Germany are smaller than in the United States (Table I). In 1970, families with children 
headed by a lone parent were relatively rare in both countries (7.4% in Germany; 11.5% in the 
United States). At that time such families were much more likely to be receiving social 
assistance in the United States than in Germany. As is weil known, the number of lone-parent 
families in the United States has grown dramatically over the past quarter century, now 
constituting more than one in four of families with children. The incidence of lone-parent 
families in Germany has grown more slowly and still amounted to less than one-tenth of a11 
families in the mid-1980s. If anything, the extent of social-assistance receipt among lone parents 
was slightly lower in the United States in the 1990s than it had been in the past. Social 
assistance receipt among German lone parents has grown markedly, although as of 1988, it still 
characterized only about one-fifth of lone-parent families with two or more children. 
Data and methods 
Our U.S. and German sampIes consist of social-assistance recipients who were observed in the 
mid-1980s at the beginning of their social assistance "careers". Sampies are further restricted to 
mothers with dependent children (below the age of 18) and not living with their husbands or 
permanent partners at the time of ini tial social-assistance receipt. 
Data from the United States come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), an 
ongoing longitudinal survey of U.S. households begun in 1968 by the Survey Research Center 
of the University of Michigan (Hili, 1992). Low-income families were initially oversampled in 
the PSID, but weights have been developed and are used throughout our analyses to adjust both 
for differential initial sampling probabilities and for differential nonresponse that has arisen 
since the beginning of the study. 
By following all members of its sampie over time, including children as they leave their parents' 
hornes, the PSID maintains a representative sampIe of the nonimmigrant U,S, population and of 
major subgroups in the population--in our case, first-time AFDC recipients. The PSID has been 
4 For a more exhaustive comparison of (he institutional differences in these between programs between 
the two countries see Leibfried (l979), 
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the source of data for the most influential analyses of AFDC dependence (e.g., Bane and 
Ellwood, 1983; Ellwood, 1986), however, none of these past studies are based on the monthly 
event-history data used in our analysis. 
PSID information on AFDC receipt was gathered on an annual basis until 1983. Questions on 
monthly AFDC receipt were added to the questionnaire in 1984, providing monthly data from 
January, 1983 until the most recent month of data available to us -- December, 1989. 
Our PSID sampIe is of first-time recipients whose receipt began between January , 1983 and 
December, 1986. Patterns of receipt are measured over the period ending in December, 1989. 
Women beginning first speils in January, 1983 would be observed for a total of 84 months; 
women beginning speils in December, 1986 would be observed only for a total of 36 months. 
"First-time" recipients in the PSID are defined as either: i) not living in a household in which 
AFDC was received in the five calendar years prior to the point of receipt during the 1983-86 
period; or ii) living in a household in which AFDC was received during that five-year period but 
not since the birth of their first child.5 Also included in the PSID sampIe are women who were 
at least in their sixth month of pregnancy with their first child when social assistance was first 
received. 
Data from Germany consist of newly-entering cases of recipients of Sozialhilfe in the Bremen 
administrative area during calendar years 1983 and 1984. The resulting data, called the Bremen 
Longitudinal Study of Social Assistance (LSA), are part of a long-term "Special Collaborative 
Project" (Sonderforschungsbereich), funded by the German National Science Foundation 
(Voges and Zwick, 1991). This research support has enabled the Bremen group to spend a great 
deal of time cleaning the data. 
The LSA compiles monthly data on the duration of social-assistance receipt, IS able to 
distinguish first-time recipients, and tracks multiple speils of receipt during the entire panel 
period (Voges, forthcoming). In the LSA, social-assistance cases began between I January, 
1983 and 31 December, 1984. Patterns of receipt could be observed for the 1983 cohort until 
March, 1989 and for the 1984 cohort until May, 1992. 
All recipients in the LSA are "first-time" recipients in the sense that there was no welfare record 
for them in the city-state of Bremen in the five-year period prior to the beginning of receipt. For 
the small number of mothers who did not live in Bremen for the full five-year period prior to 
5 An example of the members of the lauer group is a teenager whose mother received AFDC when the 
teenager was adependent and who began receiving AFDC on her Qwn after her first birth. OUf 
analysis considers (he birth Lo mark the beginning of her initial period of receipt. 
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entry on to social assistance it was assumed that welfare was not received during the portion of 
the five-year period in which the family lived elsewhere. 
Characteristics of recipients, measured at the beginning of the period of first receipt and 
reasonably comparable across the PSID and LSA data sets, include: age of the mother, age of 
youngest child, whether other adults were present in the household, whether there is evidence of 
prior work experience, receipt of public assistance in the neighborhood, and, for PSID only, 
ethnicity. 
As for household structure at the time of the first speil, we were able to distinguish situations 
with: i) mother and children only; ii) mOther and children and at least one parent of the mother; 
and iii) other family structure. Prior work experience. in the PSID was defined by whether the 
mother's reported annual work hours in the five years before the beginning of the first speil ever 
exceeded 250. In the LSA, prior work experience is determined from an examination of the 
case records. Three groups are considered as having prior work experience: i) those eligible to 
receive unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance (which means that these persons 
had a job and paid social insurance for at least six months); ii) "working poor" with 
administrative records noting employment and an income below the social-assistance need 
standard as reasons for their welfare use; and iii) cases where an occupational career was 
documented in the administrative records. 
Neighborhood conditions in the PSID were constructed by taking addresses at which the 
mother-only families resided at the point of first receipt and matching them to a 1980 Census 
geocode. Census tracts were taken to be the relevant neighborhood area whenever possible; in a 
small number of cases it was necessary to use the Enumeration District or Minor Civil Division 
as the "neighborhood" area. These geocodes were then used to match to the PSID file 1980 
Census information about the fraction of individuals in the neighborhood receiving public 
assistance. 
In the German data, neighborhood conditions were measured by the fraction of the population 
of the neighborhood district (Ortsteil) who received social assistance. Ortsteile are formed for 
planning, statistical and election purposes. The data are from the German Bureau of Census's 
"Microcensus," which is a 1% sampie of aB households drawn up yearly and questioned about 
standard demographic measures as weil as changing specific topics. Since the end of the 1970s, 
quest ions on social-assistance receipt have been included in the Microcensus about every five 
years. To ensure exogenous measurement of neighborhood conditions, we take neighborhood 
data from the 1982 Microcensus. 
I I 
Our decision to restrict our sampIes to first-time and lone-parent recipients produces a rather 
small number of cases for analysis -- 108 in the LSA and 133 in the PSID. The benefits of the 
restriction to first-time recipients are large since, as shown below, first and subsequent speils are 
quite different between the two countries. Restricting the sampIes to mother-only households 
also eliminates two-parent recipient families for whom eligibility requirements and 
administrative practices differ greatly between the two countries. 
We take three approaches to the event-history data on social-assistance receipt. The first is a 
conventional one, with a focus on the duration of the first speil of reeeipt.6 A drawback of this 
approach is its failure to aeeount for multiple speils. This is important since they are not 
uncommon in either country (Ellwood, 1986, Leisering and Voges 1993). As Ellwood (1986) 
shows in the U.S. eontext, studies based on single speils of reeeipt can be very rnisleading since 
short initial speils are just as likely as long initial speils to be followed by subsequent speils of 
reeeipt. Thus, knowing the eorrelates of the length of individual speils teils little about the 
correlates of the total duration of receipt. 
Our second approach includes information on multiple speils in a erude way by examining a 
"fixed-window" of time following first receipt. Speeifieally, we use data on patterns of social 
assistanee over the 48-month period beginning at the point of initial reeeipt. We measure the 
duration of social assistance over this period by counting the number of months in which social 
assistanee was received, without regard to whether that receipt was coneentrated in a single 
period or scattered throughout the 48-month period in a number of distinct episodes. This 
number-of-months duration measure is then used as adependent variable in OLS regression 
models. 
Our third approach is based on event-history methods, aeeounts for multiple speils and takes 
better advantage of the fact that some of our data extend for as long as 84 months beyond the 
point of initial reeeipt. In it, we consider an initial "speil" of dependenee to end only if the lone 
parent receives no social assistance for a substantial period -- 24 conseeutive months. This 
approach reflects our view that aperiod of dependence on social assistance does not end if an 
initial period of receipt is soon followed by another. Thus we adopt in our third approach the 
assumption that there must be aperiod of at least 24 months of nonreceipt to end a "speil" of 
dependenee. In terms of our event-history models, failure to be observed in the data for at least 
two years in the state of nonreeeipt produces a censored "speil" of dependence . 
6 In fact, most single-speil analyses use whatever speils are available in their data and often cannot 
distinguish between first and subsequent speils. 
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Results 
Demographie eharaeteristies 0/ recipients. There are several noteworthy differences between 
the demographie compositions of the two sampies of first-time recipients (Table 2). First, V.S. 
lone-parent recipients tend to be much younger than their German counterparts. One-fifth of 
V.S . recipients were under the age of 21 at the beginning of their periods of receipt; none of the 
German mothers were that young. German recipients were much more likely than their V.S. 
counterparts to be older than 30 or 40. Since youth has been found to be a correlate of Ion ger 
speils (Ellwood, 1986), we would expect that these age differences would tend to produce 
longer-term social-assistance receipt among V.S. recipients. 
Second, V.S recipients tend to have much younger children when they first begin recelvmg 
social assistance -- another difference that would be expected to lead to Ion ger V.S. periods of 
receipt. More than 80% of the V.S. first-time AFDC cases involved a child under the age of 
four, as compared with less than one-third of the German first-time Sozialhilfe cases. A closer 
examination of cases involving young children revealed that first births were associated with the 
beginnings of 11 % of the German cases and about 15% of the V.S. AFDC cases (data not 
shown in Table 2). 
Third, German lone-mother recipients were considerably more likely (85% vs. 56%) than their 
V.S. counterparts to be living alone with their children. A situation that might be expected to 
facilitate exits, grandparents were more likely to be found in the households of V.S. than 
German recipients. An examination of the Bremen administrative records suggests that the other 
household members often were destitute or handicapped individuals who were cared for by the 
lone mother and whose presence increased the social assistance need standard. We expect these 
circumstances to decrease the probability of terminating public assistance for German lone-
parent recipients. 
Fourth, consistent with a greater incidence of market work among V.S. mothers, a look at the 
roughly comparable measures of work experience in the two sampies showed that V.S 
recipients were considerably more likely than German recipients to have such experience. 
Fifth, the information on social-assistance receipt in the neighborhood showed great differences 
between V.S. and Germany. While only a little more than the half of the V.S. recipients lived in 
neighborhoods with relatively low concentrations (less than 10%) of public-assistance 
recipients, three-quarters of recipients in Germany lived in such neighborhoods. We expect that 
more recipients in the neighborhood would increase both the acceptability of and information 
about social assistance programs and thus be associated with Ion ger duration of social 
assistance. 
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A final demographie difference is the ethnic composition of the two sampies. Some 36.6% of 
the V.S. cases were black; the vast majority of the German caseload were native Germans. Of 
the 103 cases in the LSA, there were only three non-Germans, two of whom were asylum 
seekers (data not shown in Table 2.) 
These various demographic differences produce mixed expectations regarding the expected 
duration of receipt. The greater work experience and availability of grandparents and other 
adults to look after children would probably facilitate exits for V.S. relative to German 
recipients. On the other hand, the younger ages of the mothers and children in the V.S. and the 
worse neighborhood in which recipients live are likely to have the opposite effect. 
First speils. Figure I shows the Kaplan-Meier-based survival curve for the du ration of first 
speils -- i.e., the fraction of recipients still receiving social assistance at various points following 
the point of initial receipt.7 The survival curves follow rather different patterns in the two 
countries; a log rank test shows that the hypothesis of equal slopes can be rejected at the 9% 
significance level. 
Most interesting is the fact that the survival curves cross at a duration of about 10 months.8 This 
is the product of two important differences. First, there appear to be more quite short speils in 
Germany than in the Vnited States. About 17% of first speils in Germany last only a single 
month as compared with 10% in the Vnited States. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that 
Sozialhife often serves as "bridge" support until other sources of transfers (e.g., unemployment 
compensation) begin. In their investigation of reasons for social-assistance exits, Duncan et al. 
(forthcoming) found the beginning of social-insurance receipt was three times more likely (21 % 
vs. 7%) in Germany than in the Vnited States. 
The median length of the German speils is shorter as weil -- 9.4 months vs. 10.3 months. 
However, after less than a year, the rate at which V.S. recipients end their initial speils becomes 
considerably higher than in Germany. At a point two years after initial receipt, the fraction of 
V.S. first speils still in progress (20%) is only half the size of the comparable fraction for 
7 Details on the data underlying the figure are given in Appendix Tables la and Ib. 
8 There is some evidence of a "seam cffect" with PSID data in Figure I, with the incidence of 12,24, and 
36-month speils unusually frequent. This reflects the fact that PSID respondents have a tendency to 
report receipt for all 12 rnonths of calendar years in which AFDC income is received. Although this 
should not have much of an effect on the average dUTation of receipt. it does produce more discrete 
"steps" in the patterns of receipt. 
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Gennan first speils (38%). Thus, on the basis of first speils, it appears that long-term social-
assistanee reeeipt is more eommon in Gennany than in the United States.9 
48-monrh window. An analysis based only on first speils may be misleading if the incidence and 
duration of seeond and subsequent speils differs between the two eountries . Our data sets 
eontain too few observations for a thorough analysis of all speils of reeeipt. Instead, we take a 
more aggregative approaeh to ineorporating multiple speils. 
Our first analysis is based on patterns of soeial-assistanee receipt over a 48-month window 
following first reeeipt.1 0 As shown in Table 3, patterns of reeeipt over the 48-month window 
differed somewhat between the two eountries. On average, first-time reeipients in both eountries 
reeeived soeial assistanee during just less than half of the total number of months. Consistent 
with the first-speil data, short periods of reeeipt were less eommon among U.S. lone parents, 
although it was still the ease that nearly one-quarter of them reeeived assistanee for less than 
five total months. Also eonsistent with first-speil data, relatively long periods of reeeipt were 
also more frequent in Gennany, with 21 % of Gennan lone mothers reeeiving assistanee in all 48 
months, as eompared with only 7% of U.S. reeipients. 
Multiple speils of reeeipt are eonsiderably more eommon in the United States, oeeurring to 
nearly 40% of U.S. reeipients within the 48-month window as eompared to less than one-quarter 
of German reeipients. Multiple speils in the Uni ted States produee larger fractions of first-time 
reeipients -- 41 % in the U.S. and 32% in Gennany -- reeeiving soeial-assistanee ineome at the 
end of the 48-month observation window. 
Duration unriL /Wo years of nonreceipt. Drawing upon all of the available event-history 
information in the two data sets, survival eurves in Figure 2 ineorporate the assumption that a 
"speil" of reeeipt or dependenee ean end only if it there are at least 24 eonseeutive months of 
nonreeeipt. Patterns are strikingly different from those of the single-speil analysis, with long-
tenn reeipients now more eommon in the United States.11 As with Table 3, Figure 2 shows that 
short periods of reeeipt are more eommon in Gennany. Some 32% of Germans (vs. 26% of 
Amerieans) had ended their "dependenee" within six months of initial reeeipt. But now Gennan 
9 This conclusion appears to contradict the results from these two data sources appearing in Duncan el al. 
(fortheoming) and cited earlief. A crucial difference is that Duncan et aJ. mixed together first .nd 
subsequent speils while our speil data are for initial speils. 
10 Although the vast majority of Gertnan LSA cases were observed for aperiod longer than 48 months, a 
substantial number of V.S. AFDC recipients were not. We judged that a 48-month window would 
maximize the combination of sampie size and length of observation. 
1I A log rank test shows that the hypothesis that the survival curves have equal slopes can be rejected at 
the 13% confidence level. 
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reeipients are less likely (33% vs. 41 %) than Ameriean reeipients to have long (4+ years) 
periods of dependenee. 
Duration models. We estimated a number of bivariate and multivariate duration models on the 
separate sampies, searehing for important eountry-based interaetions and parsimonious ways of 
summarizing the strueture of the demographie effeets. We diseovered three statistieally 
signifieant interactions. First, the effeets of the age of the youngest ehild on duration was mueh 
stronger in the U.S. than in Germany. Seeond, having other adults in the household was more 
benefieial for U.S. than German reeipients. And third, the effeet of living in neighborhoods with 
greater eoneentrations of soeial-assistanee reeipients was more detrimental in Germany. All of 
our regressions include these three interaetions. 
Our simplest duration model uses OLS to relate the total number of months of reeeipt 
(regardless of speil strueture) during the 48-month window following the point of initial reeeipt 
to the initial demographie eharaeteristies of the reeipient families.12 The first eolurnn of Table 4 
show results fer OLS models in linear form; a semi-Iogarithmie form produeed virtually 
identieal patterns. 
The effeets on du ration of the age of the mother are surprisingly weak in these data, 
approaehing statistical signifieanee in neither sampie and in neither the bivariate nor 
multivariate duration models we estimated. Further disaggregation of the PSID sarnple into 
very young (i.e., under age 21) and somewhat older (i.e., age 21-25) mothers also failed to 
produee signifieant differenees. We suspeet that part of the explanation lies in the assistanee 
provided by other adults who are likely to live in the same households as the young mothers, 
although the age effeets were weak at best even in the absence of eontrols for farnily strueture. 
In eontrast, there are mueh stronger effeets for the age of the youngest ehild, partieularly in the 
PSID sampie. When eompared with the ornitted group of mothers whose youngest ehildren 
were 3-6 years old at the start of their initial speils of reeeipt, U.S. mothers with very young 
12 This regression model and the Cox models discussed below were estimated using the sampling 
weights in the PSID. Unweighted models were also estimated and showed similar although 
sornewhat less significant patterns of effects. Neither of the data sets we used are simple randorn 
sampIes from their respective populations of interest. In {he case of the PSID. the stratified and 
clustered nature of the sampie as weil as the unequal selection probabilities give rise to "design 
effeets." whieh generally cause standard eITors to be larger than what they would be with a simple 
randorn sampie. We used the sarnpling information contained in the PSID data to estimate (us ing the 
OSIRIS.IV REPERR program) standard eITors on the PSID portion of the sampie that take sampie 
design inta account. Design effects were substantial, increasing the standard eITors by a faetor of 
between 1.3 and 2.0. In terms of specific variables, the "youngest child <3" measure retained its 
significance at the 5% level , while the race variable retained it significance at the 10% level. The t-
ratio of the "youngest child >6" fell to 1.4. while the t-ratio on the prior work experience dummy fell 
to 1.2. 
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children have 20-month Ion ger durations of receipt. Somewhat surprisingly, receipt durations 
are also longer if the youngest child was old enough to be in school. 
We suspect that these patterns reflect the fact that permanent transitions off AFDC may be 
easiest when children enter school. Recipients with children in the three to six-year age range 
will usually have children making the transition to school during the observation window 
provided by our two data sets. 
Haphazard day-care facilities in the Vnited States undoubtedly make transitions prior to this 
point difficult. AFDC cases that begin with the youngest children already in school may 
constitute a self-selected set of families in difficult circumstances for whom having children in 
school is not sufficient to enable the mother to obtain employment. 
In the case of the German sampie, the statistically significant interaction terms all but eliminate 
the effect of the age of the children on duration. That mothers with very young children do not 
have significantly longer durations of receipt may reflect the high priority they receive in the 
queue for child-care slots in the Bremen administration. All child-care institutions fully or 
partially financed by the local authorities are required to give single mothers the highest priority 
for available slots. 
As expected, prior work experience was associated with significantly shorter durations. Being 
black in the PSID was associated with longer durations. Concentrations of public-assistance 
recipients in the neighborhood had an insignificant effect on the durations of V.S. recipients but 
a significantly more negative effect for German recipients. 
With one interesting exception, OLS regression of the duration of the first speIl produced 
similar results. The exception is that the presence of other adults in the household significantly 
shortened first speIls in the Vnited States but not Germany. That neither the main effect nor 
interaction was significant in the "total months" regression suggests that grandparents and other 
adults in the households of V.S. recipients may hasten initial exits (perhaps by receiving income 
that disqualifies the recipient family), but have little effect on the longer-term patterns of 
receipt. 
We next estimated event-history models that took advantage of the complete histories of receipt 
and assumed that initial "spells" of dependence were not finished unless 24 consecutive months 
of nonreceipt were observed.13 Both Cox partial-Iikelihood and log-Iogistic duration models 
produced similar results. Results from the Cox model are shown in the third column of Table 4. 
13 Here we experimented with the definition of duration during the periods of dependence. Should only 
the actual months of receipt be counted, cr should all months be counted. regardless of whether 
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The direetion (signs are reversed between the alS and Cox models sinee the Cox models are of 
eseapes, while the alS models are of duration of reeeipt) and statistieal signifieanee of the 
demographie variables in the Cox models are very similar to those of the alS duration models. 
The unexpeeted positive effect of neighbors on public-assistance recipients on social-assistance 
"escapes" in the U.S. sampie is now statistically significant; the significant interaction term still 
indieates that such neighbors are more detrimental for German recipients. 
As a final comparison, we estimated a Cox model on the duration of the first speil of receipt, 
where speil is defined in the conventional way of ending at the first instance of nonreceipt. 
Despite the rather different survival curves associated with first speils and duration defmed by 
time until 24 months of nonreceipt, a comparison of the eoefficients in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 4 show more similarities than differences. The only differences are with the 
"other adults in household" and neighborhood variables. As with the alS model of duration of 
first speil, the presence of other adults in the households of U.S. recipients shortens sueh 
durations. Neighborhood conditions become insignificant, indicating that they may be more 
important for longer-term patterns of receipt than short-term ones. 
Simple simulations. We used the coefficients from the linear alS model using a 48-month 
window to conduet a number of simulations that standardized the demographie structure of 
recipients in the two countries. We first simulated the duration of receipt over the 48-month 
window if the characteristics of the U.S. caseload were applied to the "behavior" implied by the 
German coefficients. Assuming the coefficient on "Black in the PSID" to be zero, the mean 
duration of receipt increases by 25% to 25 months. Assuming that the "Black in the PSID" 
coefficient holds in Germany increases the estimated duration to 28 months. Thus, the less 
favorable characteristics of the U.S. caseload would appear to lengthen durations if the U.S. 
caseload exhibited the "behavior" impled by the German coefficients. 
Applying the more favorable demographie structure of the German caseload to the "behavior" 
implied by the U.S. coeffieients reduces the mean months of receipt by roughly one-third to 
about 15 months. Thus both sets cf simulations show that apparent equality of average caseload 
duration in the two countries is the spurious result of the fact that German recipients have 
charaeteristics associated with shorter speils. 
social assistance was actually received? Estimating the model with both definitions produced 
equivalent results. 
18 
Summary 
Despite a more generous and less stigma-Ioaden system, German lone-parent recipients of social 
assistance do not average Ion ger periods of social-assistance receipt than their U.S. counterparts. 
Our analysis points to several reasons why this is the case. 
First, average durations provide a somewhat misleading picture of the nature of dependence in 
the two countries. The German Sozialhilfe program is much more likely than the U.S. AFDC 
program to provide short-term bridge funding for families waiting to reeeive social-insuranee 
transfers such as unemployment compensation. When the very short-term recipients are 
removed from the two sampies, then German recipients indeed have longer durations of 
assistance than their U.S. counterparts. 
Second, demographic characteristics of German recipients differ from their U.S . counterparts in 
a number of important ways, most of which appear to lead to shorter periods of dependence. 
Although having somewhat less work experience, German lone-parent recipients and their 
children are considerable older than their U.S. counterparts, facilitating the chanee of work-
related exits. Our demographie simulations show that German recipients would have shorter 
periods of dependence if subjected to the structure of the U.S. model. On the other hand, U.S . 
recipients would have decidedly Ion ger periods of dependence were they placed in the more 
generous structure of the German model. We do not want to attach too much importance to the 
precise estimates coming from our decidedly naive simulations. However, they do demonstrate 
the importance of accounting for demographie differences in cross-national studies of social-
assistance receipt. 
Third, although having somewhat Ion ger initial periods of receipt, German recipients tend to be 
more successful at "permanently" escaping from social assistance. The extent to which this is 
caused by more intensive job-training or other programs offered to German recipients is an 
important topic for further research. 
Another observation, based on data that are, at best, suggestive, is that cross-country differences 
in child-care policies may be behind the striking differences in the extent to which young 
children handicap exits from social assistance. U.S. lone parents who start AFDC speils with 
children under the age of three have much longer periods of dependence than lone parents with 
children between the ages of 3 and 6. The fact that Bremen, Germany, has a much more active 
poliey of giving recipients high priority in ehild care queues may account for at least part of this 
effect. 
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Conclusions must be viewed as tentative at this point. Our analysis does not encourage us to 
expect that a European regime of social-assistance benefits could be imported to the United 
States without lengthening the duration of receipt among U.S. recipients by at least a modest 
amount. That cost must be traded off against the gain from having far fewer children spending 
much of their childhood in poverty. 
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Table I: Extent and Social-Assistance Receipt o[ Lone-Parent Families in (West) Germany and 
the United States (in Percent) 
Fraction of Families Fraction of Single-Parent 
with Children Headed Families With Children 
By A Single Mother Receiving Socia! Assistance 
Germanya U.S b Germanyc U .S d 
Year One Child 2+Children 
1969 1.7 10.3 
1970 7.4 11.5 53.3 
1978 5.7 16.2 
1980 7.9 19.4 56.2 
1986 9.3 
1988 10.2 20.0 
1990 24.2 44.8 
1992 25.5 49.2 
aSource: Hauser and Semrau (1990), Table 4. Data are ratio of one-parent families with children and a11 
families with children. 
bSource: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1993), Table F. 
cSource: Hauser and Semrau (1990), page 9; Statistisches Bundesamt (1988), Fachserie 13 
Sozialleistungen, Reihe 2, Sozialhilfe; Statistisches Bundesamt (1988), Fachserie I, Bevölkerung und 
Erwerbstätigkeit, Reihe 3 Haushalt und Familie. 
dRatio of: (Average monthly number of families receiving Aid to Families With Dependent Children less 
number of families in Unemployed Parent (UP) component of AFDC) and (Number of families with 
children headed by a lone mother). Source of numerator: Committee on Ways and Means, Table 24, 
Columns land 4. Source of denominator: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993), Table F. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of First-time, Mother-only Recipients in the Initial Month of Receipt 
U.S.: PSID Gennany: 
(weighted) LSA 
Age of Household Head 
<21 20.0 0.0 
21-24 35.7 18.5 
25-29 24.4 31.5 
30-34 12.4 24.1 
35-40 4.9 9.2 
>40 2.6 16.7 
Age of youngest child 
<2 (incJuding pregnant) 60.3 20.4 
2-3 20.8 11.1 
3-4 3.1 12.0 
4-5 3.3 10.2 
6-10 8.6 18.5 
11+ 3.9 27.8 
Household structure 
Mother only 56.4% 85.2% 
Parent of mother present 16.5 2.8 
Other adults present 27.2 12.0 
Prior work experience? 
Yes 66.1 39.8 
No 33.9 60.2 
Ethnicity 
Black 36.6 n.a. 
Other 63.4 n.a. 
Neighborhood conditions 
Percent of households in 
neighborhood receiving 
social assistance 
<10% 53.6 77.8 
10-20% 25.0 14.8 
20-30% 14.9 7.4 
30-40% 3.0 0.0 
>40% 3.5 0.0 
Number of cases 133 108 
22 
Table 3: Distribution of Social-Assistance Receipt for First-time, Mother-only Recipients Over 
the 48-month Period Beginning with the Initial Month of Receipt 
U.S.: PSID Germany: 
(weighted) LSA 
Median months of receipt 23.6 months 23.9 months 
Mean months of receipt 20.3 months 21.9 months 
Percent with 
total receipt lasting: 
I month 6.4 16.7 
2 months 5.5 6.5 
3 months 4.3 5.6 
4 months 7.3 3.7 
5-11 months 13.4 10.2 
12 months 9.4 0.0 
13-23 months 10.9 11.1 
24 months 8.3 2.8 
25-35 months 5.5 14.8 
36 months 9.3 0.0 
37-47 months 12.5 7.4 
48 months 7.2 21.3 
Percent receiving social 
assistance in the 48th month 41.4 31.7 
Percent with: 
I speil of receipt 60.9 77.8 
2 speils 29.3 13.0 
3+ speils 9.8 9.2 
Number of cases 133 108 
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Table 4: Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors From OLS and Event-History Models of 
Duration of Social-Assistance Receipt for First-Time Recipients 
OLS Model using Cox Model, 
48-months window; duration 
dependent variable 
total months months of until24 of frrst 
of receipt first speil months of only 
receipt speil non-receipt 
German LSA = I 14.78 10.24 -0.89 -0.92 
(7.78) (7.38) (0.60) (0.51) 
Age < 25 0.81 1.37 -0.18 0.08 
(2.65) (2.51) (0.22) (0.18) 
Age 25-35 omitted ornitted ornitted ornitted 
Age > 35 -0.68 1.02 0.19 0.30 
(3.42) (3.23) (0.26) (0.22) 
Youngest child <3 20.51* 16.99* -1.50* -1.32* 
(6.28) (5.94) (0.44) (0.39) 
Youngest child -22.97* -20.32 1.62* 1.35* 
<3 * LSA = I (7.58) (7.18) (0.57) (0.49) 
Youngest omitted omitted omitted omitted 
child 3-6 
Youngest child >6 15.36* 13.75* -1.00* -1.05* 
(7.05) (6.65) (0.50) (0.46) 
Y oungest child -21.11* -20.61* 1.17* 1.37* 
>6 * LSA= I (8.09) (7.66) (.59) (0.53) 
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OLS Model using Cox Model, 
48-months window; duration 
dependent variable 
total months months of until 24 of first 
of receipt first speil months of only 
receipt speil non-receipt 
Prior Work -5.90" -7 .17" 0.66" 0.59" 
Experience = I (2.33) (2.21) (0.1 9) (0.16) 
Other adults in -3 .85 -8.41 0.15 0.72" 
household = I (3.12) (2.95) (0.26) (0.20) 
Other adults in 5.21 12.62" -0.39 -1.39" 
household (5.43) (5.14) (0.45) (0.38) 
" LSA = 1 
Black in PSID 9.44" 6.98" -0.64" -0.51" 
sampIe = I (3.18) (3.0 I) (0.27) (0.21 ) 
% households in -1.96 -0.33 0.19" 0.01 
neighborhood (1.33) ( 1.26) (0.09) (0.09) 
receiving Public 
Assistance 
% households in 9.71" 9.78* -0.51 * 0.38 
neighborhood (3.08) (2 .92) (0.25) (0.20) 
receiving Public 
Assistance *LSA 
Constant 6.14 5.57 
(6.80) (6.43) 
R-square 0.10 0.1 4 
(adjusted) 
Log-likelihood 
-726.50 -995 .36 
Number of cases 241 24 1 241 241 
Note: "*" indicated that the coefflcient is more than twice its standard error. 
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Table 5: Simulations of Duration of Social-Assistance Receipt over the 48-Month Window, for 
First-Time Recipients of Social Assistance 
Observed mean 
U.S . means and Gennan 
coefficients (assuming 
zero coefficient for 
"Black in PSID sampie") 
U.S. means and Gennan 
coefficients (assuming 
U.S. coefficient for 
"Black in PSID sampie") 
Gennan means (assuming 
no blacks) and U.S. 
coefficients 
German means (assuming 
U.S. percentage black 
-- 36.6%) and U.S. 
coefficients 
U.S.: PSID 
20.3 months 
25.0 
28.4 
Gennany: LSA 
21.9 months 
15.1 
18.6 
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Figur" 1: Duration of FIrSt Episode of Socia! Assistance for Lone Mothers in 
Germany and the United States 
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Appendix Table I a: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of First Speils in German LSA: 
Number Number Exposed 
fD Index Time Events 
0 0 0.00 0 
0 I 1.00 18 
0 2 2.00 8 
0 3 3.00 6 
0 4 4.00 4 
0 5 5.00 2 
0 6 6.00 2 
0 7 7.00 7 
0 8 8.00 2 
0 9 9.00 2 
0 10 10.00 3 
0 11 12.00 I 
0 12 14.00 I 
0 13 17.00 I 
0 14 19.00 I 
0 15 20.00 I 
0 16 21.00 I 
0 17 23.00 I 
0 18 24.00 2 
0 19 25.00 I 
0 20 26.00 I 
0 21 27.00 I 
0 22 28.00 1 
0 23 29.00 I 
0 24 31 .00 I 
0 25 33.00 I 
0 26 35.00 I 
0 27 36.00 I 
0 28 38.00 1 
0 29 40.00 1 
0 30 43.00 2 
0 31 47.00 I 
0 32 52.00 2 
0 33 54.00 I 
0 34 57.00 I 
0 35 58.00 I 
0 36 60.00 I 
0 37 61.00 I 
0 38 62.00 I 
0 39 63.00 I 
0 40 64.00 2 
0 41 65.00 2 
0 42 66.00 I 
0 43 67.00 I 
0 44 68.00 I 
0 45 70.00 I 
0 46 72.00 4 
Median DuralIon. 9.36 
Cases: 108 weighted: 108 
Censored to Risk 
0 108 
0 108 
2 88 
0 80 
2 72 
I 67 
I 64 
0 62 
0 55 
I 52 
I 49 
0 46 
0 45 
2 42 
0 41 
0 40 
0 39 
0 38 
0 37 
0 35 
0 34 
0 33 
0 32 
0 31 
0 30 
0 29 
0 28 
0 27 
0 26 
0 25 
0 24 
0 22 
0 21 
0 19 
0 18 
0 17 
0 16 
0 15 
0 14 
0 13 
0 12 
0 10 
0 8 
0 7 
0 6 
0 5 
0 4 
Survivor Std. 
Function Error 
1.00000 0.00000 
0.83333 0.03586 
0.75758 0.04141 
0.70076 0.04433 
0.66183 0.04594 
0.64207 0.04665 
0.62201 0.04730 
0.55178 0.04884 
0.53171 0.04908 
0.51126 0.04928 
0.47996 0.04946 
0.46953 0.04948 
0.45909 0.04947 
0.44816 0.04948 
0.43723 0.04947 
0.42630 0.04942 
0.41537 0.04935 
0.40444 0.04925 
0.38258 0.04895 
0.37165 0.04876 
0.36072 0.04853 
0.34979 0.04828 
0.33886 0.04799 
0.32792 0.04767 
0.31699 0.04732 
0.30606 0.04693 
0.29513 0.04651 
0.28420 0.04606 
0.27327 0.04556 
0.26234 0.04503 
0.24048 0.04385 
0.22955 0.04320 
0.20769 0.04176 
0.19675 0.04097 
0.18582 0.04012 
0.17489 0.03922 
0.16396 0.03827 
0.15303 0.03724 
0.14210 0.03615 
0.13117 0.03498 
0.10931 0.03239 
0.08745 0.02937 
0.07652 0.02766 
0.06558 0.02578 
0.05465 0.02368 
0.04372 0.02132 
0.00000 • 
Cum. 
Rate 
0.00000 
0.18232 
0.27763 
0.35559 
0.41275 
0.44306 
0.47481 
0.59461 
0.63165 
0.67087 
0.73405 
0.75603 
0.77850 
0.80260 
0.82729 
0.85261 
0.87858 
0.90525 
0.96082 
0.98981 
1.01966 
1.05043 
1.08218 
1.11497 
1.14887 
1.18396 
1.22033 
1.25807 
1.29729 
1.33812 
1.42513 
1.47165 
1.57173 
1.62580 
1.68296 
1.74358 
1.80812 
1.87711 
1.95122 
2.03126 
2.21358 
2.43673 
2.57026 
2.7244 1 
2.90673 
3.12987 
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Appendix Table I b: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of First Speils in V.S. PSID 
Number Number Exposed 
ID Index Time Events 
I 0 0.00 0 
1 I 1.00 12 
I 2 2.00 12 
I 3 3.00 5 
1 4 4.00 11 
1 5 5.00 3 
I 6 6.00 5 
I 7 7.00 0 
I 8 8.00 6 
1 9 9.00 3 
1 10 10.00 2 
1 11 11.00 4 
1 12 12.00 9 
1 13 13.00 0 
1 14 14.00 2 
1 15 15.00 0 
1 16 16.00 6 
1 17 20.00 2 
1 18 21.00 0 
1 19 22.00 0 
1 20 23.00 0 
I 21 24.00 13 
1 22 27.00 0 
I 23 28.00 0 
I 24 30.00 I 
I 25 34.00 3 
I 26 36.00 6 
I 27 41.00 2 
I 28 42.00 0 
I 29 46.00 0 
I 30 47.00 0 
I 31 58.00 0 
I 32 67.00 I 
I 33 84.00 0 
MedIan DuratlOn. 10.31 
Duration limes limited to: 84 
Cases: 133 weighted: 133.001 
Censored to Risk 
0 133 
0 133 
0 120 
0 107 
0 101 
0 90 
0 86 
0 81 
0 80 
0 74 
0 70 
0 67 
0 63 
0 54 
0 53 
0 51 
0 50 
0 44 
0 41 
0 40 
0 40 
0 39 
0 26 
0 25 
0 25 
0 23 
0 19 
0 12 
0 10 
0 9 
0 9 
6 2 
0 2 
2 0 
Survivor Std. 
Function Error 
1.00000 0.00000 
0.90418 0.02552 
0.80992 0.03402 
0.76679 0.03667 
0.68214 0.04038 
0.65354 0.04126 
0.61261 0.04224 
0.60642 0.04236 
0.56062 0.04304 
0.53306 0.04326 
0.51065 0.04335 
0.47626 0.04331 
0.40800 0.04262 
0.40383 0.04255 
0.38478 0.04219 
0.38253 0.04214 
0.33210 0.04084 
0.31062 0.04013 
0.30767 0.04002 
0.30437 0.03990 
0.29852 0.03968 
0.19673 0.03447 
0.18996 0.03401 
0.18834 0.03390 
0.17786 0.03316 
0.14914 0.03089 
0.10149 0.02619 
0.08140 0.02381 
0.07803 0.02337 
0.07693 0.02323 
0.07565 0.02306 
0.07319 0.02369 
0.03594 0.02746 
0.03594 0.02746 
29 
Cum. 
Rate 
0.00000 
0.10073 
0.21082 
0.26554 
0.38251 
0.42535 
0.49003 
0.50019 
0.57871 
0.62912 
0.67206 
0.74179 
0.89648 
0.90675 
0.95507 
0.96096 
1.l0232 
1.16919 
1.17874 
1.18953 
1.20893 
1.62590 
1.66094 
1.66951 
1.72676 
1.90285 
2.28776 
2.50839 
2.55066 
2.56483 
2.58162 
2.61468 
3.32578 
3.32578 
30 
Appendix Table 2a: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Time Until 24 Months of Nonreceipt in German 
LSA: 
Number Number Exposed 
ID Index Time Events 
0 0 0.00 0 
0 I 1.00 16 
0 2 2.00 5 
0 3 3.00 6 
0 4 4.00 4 
0 5 5.00 2 
0 6 6.00 2 
0 7 7.00 4 
0 8 9.00 2 
0 9 10.00 1 
0 10 14.00 1 
0 11 17.00 1 
0 12 19.00 1 
0 13 21.00 2 
0 14 23.00 2 
0 15 24.00 I 
0 16 25.00 2 
0 17 26.00 3 
0 18 27.00 1 
0 19 29.00 1 
0 20 30.00 1 
0 21 31 .00 2 
0 22 33 .00 1 
0 23 35 .00 I 
0 24 36.00 2 
0 25 38.00 I 
0 26 40.00 I 
0 27 43 .00 I 
0 28 47 .00 I 
0 29 57 .00 I 
0 30 58.00 1 
0 31 72.00 0 
MedIan Duratton. 25.08 
Duration limes limited to: 58 
Cases: 108 weighted: 108 
Censored to Risk 
0 108 
0 108 
2 90 
0 85 
1 78 
1 73 
0 71 
0 69 
0 65 
0 63 
0 62 
2 59 
0 58 
0 57 
0 55 
0 53 
0 52 
0 50 
0 47 
2 44 
I 42 
I 40 
0 38 
0 37 
0 36 
0 34 
0 33 
I 31 
I 29 
5 23 
0 22 
21 5 
Survivor Std. Cum. 
Function EITor Rate 
1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.85185 0.03418 0.16034 
0.80453 0.03828 0.21750 
0.74774 0.04202 0.29070 
0.70939 0.04402 0.34335 
0.68996 0.04491 0.37113 
0.67052 0.04570 0.39970 
0.63165 0.04700 0.45942 
0.61221 0.04752 0.49067 
0.60250 0.04775 0.50667 
0.59278 0.04796 0.52293 
0.58273 0.04819 0.54003 
0.57268 0.04839 0.55742 
0.55259 0.04873 0.59314 
0.53250 0.04899 0.63018 
0.52245 0.04908 0.64923 
0.50236 0.04921 0.68845 
0.47221 0.04924 0.75032 
0.46217 0.04921 0.77183 
0.45166 0.04920 0.79482 
0.44091 0.04919 0.81892 
0.41886 0.04913 0.87021 
0.40784 0.04906 0.89688 
0.39682 0.04896 0.92428 
0.37477 0.04866 0.98144 
0.36375 0.04846 1.01129 
0.35273 0.04823 1.04206 
0.34135 0.04800 1.07485 
0.32958 0.04776 I. 10994 
0.31525 0.04779 1.15439 
0.30092 0.04771 1.20091 
0.30092 0.04771 1.20091 
Appendix Table 2b: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Time Umil 24 Momhs of Nonreceipt in U.S. 
PSID 
Number Number Exposed 
ID Index Time Events 
I 0 0.00 0 
I I 1.00 8 
I 2 2.00 7 
I 3 3.00 5 
I 4 4.00 9 
I 5 5.00 0 
I 6 6.00 3 
I 7 7.00 0 
I 8 8.00 I 
I 9 9.00 2 
I 10 10.00 2 
I II 11.00 4 
I 12 12.00 8 
I 13 13.00 0 
I 14 14.00 2 
I 15 15 .00 0 
I 16 19.00 5 
I 17 20.00 3 
I 18 22.00 0 
I 19 24.00 5 
I 20 28.00 0 
I 21 35.00 0 
I 22 36.00 I 
I 23 41.00 0 
I 24 42.00 0 
I 25 45 .00 0 
I 26 54.00 0 
I 27 84.00 0 
MedIan DuratlOn. 19.42 
Duration times limited to: 84 
Cases: 133 weighted: 133.001 
Censored to Risk 
0 133 
0 133 
0 124 
0 117 
0 1II 
0 102 
0 101 
0 98 
0 98 
0 96 
0 93 
0 90 
0 85 
0 77 
0 76 
0 73 
0 73 
0 67 
0 64 
0 64 
0 58 
0 58 
0 57 
2 53 
0 53 
0 52 
19 32 
31 I 
Survivor Std. Cum. 
Function Error Rate 
1.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.93463 0.02143 0.06760 
0.87998 0.02818 0.12786 
0.83685 0.03204 0.17812 
0.76731 0.03664 0.26486 
0.76569 0.03673 0.26698 
0.74160 0.03796 0.29894 
0.73709 0.03817 0.30505 
0.72377 0.03877 0.32328 
0.70293 0.03962 0.35250 
0.68052 0.04043 0.38489 
0.64613 0.04146 0.43675 
0.57909 0.04281 0.54630 
0.57492 0.04287 0.55353 
0.55587 0.04308 0.58722 
0.55361 0.04311 0.59129 
0.51013 0.04335 0.67309 
0.48593 0.04334 0.72169 
0.48263 0.04333 0.72850 
0.43840 0.04303 0.82463 
0.43678 0.04301 0.82833 
0.43434 0.04298 0.83392 
0.42381 0.04285 0.85848 
0.42210 0.04283 0.86252 
0.41866 0.04280 0.87069 
0.41460 0.04277 0.88043 
0.41371 0.04281 0.88260 
0.41371 0.04281 0.88260 
31 
32 
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